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Abstract
Excess individual creativity can be detrimental to society
because creators invest in unproven ideas at the expense
of propagating proven ones. Moreover, a proportion of
individuals can benefit from creativity without being creative
themselves by copying creators. We hypothesized that
(1) societies increase their rate of cultural evolution by
tempering the novelty-generating effects of creativity with
the novelty-preserving effects of imitation, and (2) this is
carried out by selectively rewarding and punishing creativity
according to the value of the individuals’ creative outputs. We
tested this using an agent-based model of cultural evolution
in which each agent self-regulated its invention-to-imitation
ratio as a function of the fitness of its cultural outputs. In
self-regulating societies, agents segregated into creators and
imitators. The mean fitness of cultural outputs was higher
than in non-self-regulating societies, and changes in diversity
were rapider and more pronounced. We discuss limitations
and possible social implications of our findings.
Keywords: Agent-based model; creativity; imitation; individ-
ual differences; self regulation; cultural evolution EVOC.
Introduction
It is commonly assumed that creativity is desirable, and
the more creative one is, the better. Our capacity for self-
expression, problem solving, and making aesthetically pleas-
ing artifacts, all stem from our creative abilities. However,
individuals often claim that their creativity is stifled by social
norms, policies, and institutions. Moreover, our educational
systems do not appear to prioritize the cultivation of creativ-
ity, and in some ways discourage it.
Perhaps there is an adaptive value to these seemingly
mixed messages that society sends about the social desirabil-
ity of creativity. Perhaps what is best for society is that indi-
viduals vary widely with respect to how creative they are, so
as to ensure that the society as a whole both generates novel
variants, and preserves the best of them. This paper provides
a computational test of the hypothesis that society as a whole
benefits when individuals can vary how creative they are in
response to the perceived effectiveness of their ideas.
Definition and Key Features of Creativity
There are a plethora of definitions of creativity in the litera-
ture; nevertheless, it is commonly accepted that a core char-
acteristic of creativity is the production of an idea or product
that meets two criteria: originality or novelty, and appropri-
ateness, adaptiveness, or usefulness, i.e., relevance to the task
at hand (Guilford, 1950; Moran, 2011). Not only are humans
individually creative, but we build on each other’s ideas such
that over centuries, art, science, and technology, as well as
customs and folk knowledge, can be said to evolve. This
cumulative building of new innovations on existing prod-
ucts is sometimes referred to as the ratchet effect (Tomasello,
Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Creativity has long been associated
with personal fulfillment (May, 1975; Rogers, 1959), self-
actualization (Maslow, 1959), and maintaining a competitive
edge in the marketplace. Thus it is often assumed that more
creativity is necessarily better.
However, there are significant drawbacks to creativity
(Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 2010; Ludwig, 1995).
Generating creative ideas is difficult and time consuming, and
a creative solution to one problem often generates other prob-
lems, or has unexpected negative side effects that may only
become apparent after much effort has been invested. Cre-
ativity is correlated with rule bending, law breaking, and so-
cial unrest (Sternberg & Lubart, 1995; Sulloway, 1996), ag-
gression (Tacher & Readdick, 2006), group conflict (Troyer
& Youngreen, 2009), and dishonesty (Gino & Ariely, 2012).
Creative individuals are more likely to be viewed as aloof,
arrogant, competitive, hostile, independent, introverted, lack-
ing in warmth, nonconformist, norm doubting, unconscien-
tious, unfriendly (Batey & Furnham, 2006; Qian, Plucker, &
Shen, 2010; Treffinger, Young, Selby, & Shepardson, 2002).
They tend to be more emotionally unstable, and more prone
to affective disorders such as depression and bipolar disorder,
and have a higher incidence of schizophrenic tendencies, than
other segments of the population (Andreason, 1987; Eysenck,
1993; Flaherty, 2005). They are also more prone to drug and
alcohol abuse, as well as suicide (Jamison, 1993; Goodwin,
1998; Rothenberg, 1990; Kaufman, 2003). This suggests that
there is a cost to creativity, both to the individual and to soci-
ety.
Balancing Novelty with Continuity
Given the correlation between creativity and personality traits
that are potentially socially disruptive, it is perhaps fortunate
that in a group of interacting individuals, not all of them need
be particularly creative for the benefits of creativity to be felt
throughout the group. The rest can reap the rewards of the
creator’s ideas by copying them, buying from them, or sim-
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ply admiring them. Few of us know how to build a computer,
or write a symphony, but they are nonetheless ours to use and
enjoy. Of course, if everyone relied on the strategy of imi-
tating others rather than coming up with their own ideas, the
generation of cultural novelty would grind to a halt. On the
other hand, if everyone were as creative as the most creative
amongst us, the frequency of the above-mentioned antisocial
tendencies of creative people might be sufficiently high to in-
terfere with cultural stability; i.e., the perpetuation of cultural
continuity. It is well known in theoretical biology that both
novelty and continuity are essential for evolution, that is, for
cumulative, open-ended, adaptive change over time.
This need for both novelty and continuity was demon-
strated in an agent-based model of cultural evolution (Gabora,
1995). Novelty was injected into the artificial society through
the invention of new actions, and continuity was preserved
through the imitation of existing actions. When agents never
invented, there was nothing to imitate, and there was no cul-
tural evolution at all. If the ratio of invention to imitation
was even marginally greater than 0, not only was cumula-
tive cultural evolution possible, but eventually all agents con-
verged on optimal cultural outputs. When all agents always
invented and never imitated, the mean fitness of cultural out-
puts was also sub-optimal because fit ideas were not dispers-
ing through society. The society as a whole performed op-
timally when the ratio of creating to imitating was approx-
imately 2:1. Although results obtained with a simple com-
puter model may have little bearing on complex human soci-
eties, the finding that extremely high levels of creativity can
be detrimental to the society suggests that there may be an
adaptive value to society’s ambivalent attitude toward creativ-
ity.
This suggested that society as a whole might benefit from
a distinction between the conventional workforce and what
has been called a “creative class” (Florida, 2002) This was
investigated in the model by introducing two types of agents:
imitators, that only obtained new actions by imitating neigh-
bors, and creators, that obtained new actions either by in-
venting or imitating (Gabora & Firouzi, 2012). It was pos-
sible to vary the probability that creators create versus imi-
tate; thus, whereas a given agent was either a creator or an
imitator throughout the entire run, the proportion of creators
innovating or imitating in a given iteration fluctuated stochas-
tically. The mean fitness of ideas across the artificial society
was highest when not all agents were creators. Specifically,
there was a tradeoff between C, the proportion of creators
to imitators in the society, and p, how creative the creators
were). This provided further support for the hypothesis that
society as a whole functions optimally when creativity is tem-
pered with continuity.
We then hypothesized that society as a whole might per-
form even better if individuals are able to adjust how cre-
ative they are over time in accordance with their perceived
creative success. This could occur through mechanisms such
as selective ostracization of deviant behaviour unless accom-
panied by the generation of valuable cultural novelty, and en-
couraging of successful creators. In this way society might
self-organize into a balanced mix of novelty generating cre-
ators and continuity perpetuating imitators, both of which are
necessary for cumulative cultural evolution. A first step in
investigating this hypothesis was to determine whether it is
algorithmically possible to increase the mean fitness of ideas
in a society by enabling them to self-regulate how creative
they are.
The Computational Model
We investigated this using an agent-based model of cultural
evolution referred to as “EVOlution of Culture”, abbreviated
EVOC. It uses neural network based agents that (1) invent
new ideas, (2) imitate actions implemented by neighbors, (3)
evaluate ideas, and (4) implement successful ideas as actions.
EVOC is an elaboration of Meme and Variations, or MAV
(Gabora, 1995), the earliest computer program to model cul-
ture as an evolutionary process in its own right, as opposed to
modeling the interplay of cultural and biological evolution1.
The goal behind MAV, and also behind EVOC, was to distil
the underlying logic of not biological evolution but cultural
evolution, i.e., the process by which ideas adapt and build on
one another in the minds of interacting individuals. Agents
do not evolve in a biological sense, for they neither die nor
have offspring, but do in a cultural sense, by generating and
sharing ideas for actions. In cultural evolution, the generation
of novelty takes place through invention , and the differential
replication of novelty takes place through imitation . EVOC
was originally developed to investigate the similarities and
differences between biological and cultural evolution, and it
has been used to address such questions as how does the pres-
ence of leaders or barriers to the diffusion of ideas affect cul-
tural evolution.
We now summarize briefly the architecture of EVOC in
sufficient detail to explain our results; for further details we
refer the reader to previous publications (Gabora, 1995; Gab-
ora, Chia, & Firouzi, 2013; Gabora & Firouzi, 2012).
Agents
Agents consist of (1) a neural network, which encodes ideas
for actions and detects trends in what constitutes a fit ac-
tion, (2) a ‘perceptual system’, which observes and evalu-
ates neighbours’ actions, and (3) a body, consisting of six
body parts which implement actions. The neural network
is composed of six input nodes and six corresponding out-
put nodes that represent concepts of body parts (LEFT ARM,
RIGHT ARM, LEFT LEG, RIGHT LEG, HEAD, and HIPS),
and seven hidden nodes that represent more abstract concepts
(LEFT, RIGHT, ARM, LEG, SYMMETRY, OPPOSITE, and
MOVEMENT). Input nodes and output nodes are connected
to hidden nodes of which they are instances (e.g., RIGHT
1The approach can thus be contrasted with computer models of
how individual learning affects biological evolution (Best, 1999;
Higgs, 1992; Hinton & Nowlan, 1992; Hutchins & Hazelhurst,
1991).
ARM is connected to RIGHT.) Each body part can occupy
one of three possible positions: a neutral or default position,
and two other positions, which are referred to as active po-
sitions. Activation of any input node activates the MOVE-
MENT hidden node. Same-direction activation of symmet-
rical input nodes (e.g., positive activation – which represents
upward motion – of both arms) activates the SYMMETRY
node.
Invention
An idea for a new action is a pattern consisting of six elements
that dictate the placement of the six body parts. Agents gener-
ate new actions by modifying their initial action or an action
that has been invented previously or acquired through imita-
tion. During invention, the pattern of activation on the output
nodes is fed back to the input nodes, and invention is biased
according to the activations of the SYMMETRY and MOVE-
MENT hidden nodes. (Were this not the case there would
be no benefit to using a neural network.) To invent a new
idea, for each node of the idea currently represented on the
input layer of the neural network, the agent makes a proba-
bilistic decision as to whether the position of that body part
will change, and if it does, the direction of change is stochas-
tically biased according to the learning rate. If the new idea
has a higher fitness than the currently implemented idea, the
agent learns and implements the action specified by that idea.
When “chaining” is turned on, an agent can keep adding new
sub-actions and thereby execute a multi-step action, so long
as the most recently-added sub-action is both an optimal sub-
action and different from the previous sub-action of that ac-
tion (Gabora et al., 2013).
Imitation
The process of finding a neighbour to imitate works through
a form of lazy (non-greedy) search. The imitating agent ran-
domly scans its neighbours, and adopts the first action that is
fitter than the action it is currently implementing. If it does
not find a neighbour that is executing a fitter action than its
own current action, it continues to execute the current action.
Evaluation: The Fitness Function
Following Holland (1975), we refer to the success of an ac-
tion in the artificial world as its fitness, with the caveat that
unlike its usage in biology, here the term is unrelated to num-
ber of offspring (or ideas derived from a given idea). The fit-
ness function used in these experiments rewards activity of all
body parts except for the head, and symmetrical limb move-
ment. Fitness of a single-step action Fn is determined as per
Eq. 1. Total body movement, m, is calculated by adding the
number of active body parts, i.e., body parts not in the neutral
position.
Fn = m+1.5(sa + st)+2(1−mh) (1)
sa = 1 if arms move symmetrically; 0 otherwise
st = 1 if legs move symmetrically; 0 otherwise
mh = 1 if head is stationary; 0 otherwise
Note that there are multiple optima. (For example an action
can be optimal if either both arms move up or if both arms
move down.) The fitness Fc of a multi-step action with n
chained single-step actions (each with fitness Fn) is calculated
by Eq. 2.
Fc =
n
∑
k=1
Fn
1.2n−1
(2)
Learning
Invention makes use of the ability to detect, learn, and re-
spond adaptively to trends. Since no action acquired through
imitation or invention is implemented unless it is fitter than
the current action, new actions provide valuable information
about what constitutes an effective idea. Knowledge acquired
through the evaluation of actions is translated into educated
guesses about what constitutes a successful action by updat-
ing the learning rate. For example, an agent may learn that
more overall movement tends to be either beneficial (as with
the fitness function used here) or detrimental, or that sym-
metrical movement tends to be either beneficial (as with the
fitness function used here) or detrimental, and bias the gener-
ation of new actions accordingly.
The Artificial World
These experiments used a default artificial world: a toroidal
lattice with 1024 cells each occupied by a single, stationary
agent, and a von Neumann neighborhood structure. Creators
and imitators were randomly dispersed.
A Typical Run
Fitness and diversity of actions are initially low because all
agents are initially immobile, implementing the same action,
with all body parts in the neutral position. Soon some agent
invents an action that has a higher fitness than immobility,
and this action gets imitated, so fitness increases. Fitness in-
creases further as other ideas get invented, assessed, imple-
mented as actions, and spread through imitation. The diver-
sity of actions increases as agents explore the space of possi-
ble actions, and then decreases as agents hone in on the fittest
actions. Thus, over successive rounds of invention and im-
itation, the agents’ actions improve. EVOC thereby models
how “descent with modification” occurs in a purely cultural
context.
Method
To test the hypothesis that the mean fitness of cultural outputs
across society increases faster with social regulation (SR)
than without it, we increased the relative frequency of inven-
tion for agents that generated superior ideas, and decreased
it for agents that generated inferior ideas. To implement this
the computer code was modified as follows. Each iteration,
for each agent, the fitness of its current action relative to the
mean fitness of actions for all agents at the previous iteration
was assessed. Thus we obtained the relative fitness (RF) of its
cultural output. An agent’s personal probability of creating,
p(C), was a function of RF , determined as follows:
p(C)n = p(C)n−1×RFn−1 (3)
The probability of imitating, p(I), was 1 - p(C). Thus
when SR was on, if relative fitness was high the agent in-
vented more, and if it was low the agent imitated more. p(C)
was initialized at 0.5 for both SR and non-SR societies. We
compared runs with SR to runs without it.
Results
All data are averages across 250 runs. The mean fitness of
the cultural outputs of societies with SR (the ability to self-
regulate inventiveness as a function of inventive success) was
higher than that of societies without SR, as shown in Figure
1. The fact that ideas got increasingly fitter over the course
of a run was due to the fact that chaining was turned on; a
fit action could always be made fitter by adding another sub-
action. When chaining was turned off, societies with SR also
outperformed those without it, except that in both SR an non-
SR societies the mean fitness plateaued when all agents con-
verged on optimally fit ideas (not shown).
Figure 1: This graph plots the mean fitness of implemented
actions across all agents over the duration of the run with
and without social regulation.
The typical pattern was observed with respect to the diver-
sity, or number of different ideas: an increase as the space
of possibilities is explored followed by a decrease as agents
converge on fit actions. However, this pattern occurred ear-
lier, and was more pronounced, in societies with SR than in
societies without it, as shown in Figure 2. Inferior inven-
tors tended to come up with the same ideas and thus discour-
aging them did not lower diversity, while the ideas of supe-
rior inventors tended to go off in different directions, thereby
increasing diversity. Note that, with chaining turned on, al-
though the number of different actions decreases, the agents
do not converge on a static set of actions; the set of imple-
mented actions changes continuously as they find new, fitter
actions.
Figure 2: This graph plots the diversity, or total number of
different actions, across all agents over the duration of the
run with and without social regulation.
Societies with SR ended up separating into two distinct
groups: one that primarily invented, and one that primarily
imitated, as illustrated in Figure 3. Thus the observed in-
crease in fitness can indeed be attributed to increasingly pro-
nounced individual differences in their degree of creative ex-
pression over the course of a run. Agents that generated su-
perior cultural outputs had more opportunity to do so, while
agents that generated inferior cultural outputs became more
likely to propagate proven effective ideas rather than reinvent
the wheel.
Discussion
Should society encourage creativity whenever possible, or
with respect to creativity, can there be too much of a good
thing? Are the needs of the individual for creative expres-
sion at odds with society’s need to reinforce conventions and
established protocols? EVOC agents are too rudimentary to
suffer the affective penalties of creativity but the model incor-
porates another drawback to creativity: time spent inventing
is time not spent imitating. Creative agents, whose efforts go
into reprocessing their own ideas rather than copying others,
effectively rupture the fabric of the artificial society; they act
as insulators that impede the diffusion of proven solutions.
Imitators, in contrast, serve as a “cultural memory” that en-
sures the preservation of successful ideas. When effective
inventors created more and poor inventors created less, the
society as a whole could capitalize on the creative abilities of
the best inventors and capitalize on efforts of the rest to dis-
seminate fit cultural outputs. The results suggest that it can be
beneficial for a social group if individuals are allowed to fol-
low different developmental trajectories in accordance with
their demonstrated successes.
These results do not prove that in real societies successful
creators invent more and unsuccessful creators invent less;
Figure 3: At the beginning of the run (top) all agents created
and imitated with equal probability. Midway through the run
their p(C) values were distributed along the range of values
from 0 to 1. By the end of the run (bottom) they had
segregated into imitators (with p(C) from 0 to 0.1) and
creators (with p(C) from 0.9 to 1).
they merely show this kind of self-regulation is a feasible
means of increasing the mean fitness of creative outputs.
However, the fact that strong individual differences in creativ-
ity exist (Kaufman, 2003; Wolfradt & Pretz, 2001) suggests
that this occurs in real societies. Whether prompted by indi-
viduals themselves or mediated by way of social cues, fam-
ilies, organizations, or societies may evolve faster by spon-
taneously self-organizing to achieve a balance between cre-
ative processes that generate innovations and the imitative
processes that disseminate these innovations. They thereby
temper novelty with continuity. A more complex version of
this scheme is that individuals find a task at which they excel,
such that for each task domain there exists some individual
in the social group who comes to be best equipped to explore
that space of possibilities.
The social practice of discouraging creativity until the in-
dividual has proven him- or herself may serve as a form of
social self-regulation ensuring that creative efforts are not
squandered. Individuals who are tuned to social norms and
expectations may over time become increasingly concerned
with imitating and cooperating with others in a manner that
promotes cultural continuity. Their thoughts travel more
well-worn routes, and they are increasingly less likely to in-
novate. Others might be tuned to the demands of creative
tasks, and less tethered to social norms and expectations, and
thereby more likely to see things from unconventional per-
spectives. Thus they are more likely to come up with solu-
tions to problems or unexpected challenges, find new avenues
for self-expression, and contribute to the generation of cul-
tural novelty. In other words, what Cropley et al. (2010) refer
to as the “dark side of creativity” may reflect that the creative
individual is tuned to task needs at expense of human needs.
Although in the long run this benefits the group as a whole
because it results in creative outputs, in the short run the cre-
ative individual may be less likely to obey social norms and
live up to social expectations, and to experience stigmatiza-
tion or discrimination as a result, particularly in his/her early
years (Craft, 2005; Scott, 1999; Torrance, 1963). Once the
merits of such individuals’ creative efforts become known,
they may be supported or even idolized.
The goal here was to investigate a hypothesis concerning
the relationship between creativity and society rather than to
come up with the most realistic model of creativity possible.
However, a limitation of this work is that currently EVOC
does not allow an agent to imitate some features of an idea
and not others. This would be useful because cultural outputs
both in EVOC and the real world exhibit a version of what
in biology is referred to as epistasis, wherein what is optimal
with respect to one component depends on what is going on
with respect to another. Once both components have been op-
timized in a mutually beneficial way (in EVOC, for example,
symmetrical arm movement), excess creativity risks break-
ing up co-adapted partial solutions. In future studies we will
investigate the effects of enabling partial imitation. Another
limitation is that the fitness function was static throughout a
run, and agents had only one action to optimize. In real life,
there are many tasks, and a division of labor such that each
agent specializes in a few tasks, and imitates other agents to
carry out other tasks. It may be that no one individual is
an across-the-board “creator” or “imitator” but that different
individuals find different niches for domain-specific creative
outputs.
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